피라미드 소유구조에서 기업 위치와 경영성과：터널링과 선택효과

[Purpose] In pyramidal ownership structure, firms at lower tiers tend to exhibit lower performance. Two competing explanations exist for this phenomenon. One is the tunneling hypothesis that controlling shareholders transfer resources from lower－tier to higher－tier firms for their private benefits. The other is the selection effect that less profitable firms are placed in lower tiers due to external financing constraints. This study investigates the relative magnitudes of tunneling and selection effects in pyramidal ownership. [Methodology] Using a sample of listed firms from 2001 to 2014년 on Korean stock markets, this study examines the performance of chaebol firms under holding－company system, those under circular－shareholding systems, and non－chaebol firms to identify the net impact of tunneling and selection effects. [Findings] First, chaebol firms within holding－company systems show a negative association between position and performance, whereas no such association is observed in chaebol firms within circular－holding systems. Second, holding－company chaebol firms perform indifferently from non－chaebol firms, while circular－shareholding chaebol firms significantly underperform non－chaebol firms. [Implications] The findings suggest that in holding－company system, tunneling may exist but is offset by efficient management arising from selection effect, leading to performance comparable to that of non－chaebol firms.