정복 전쟁과 소모전: 게임이론적 분석

War damages can vary significantly between parties. Existing research has often overlooked this asymmetry, limiting analysis of its impact on strategic behavior. This study analyzes how parties react to war damage in two types of conflicts—conquest and attrition—and how outcomes differ. In a war of conquest, the victor largely bears regional damage, while in attrition wars, both sides endure the damage. Our study proposes two contest models that account for this asymmetric damage, where each party optimizes its force level for expected payoffs. Findings for asymmetric wars of conquest: Parties sensitively reduce their force level due to ex-ante damage caused by both their own actions and the adversary's. Notably, if the adversary's inflicted damage is greater, a party reduces force even more, paradoxically increasing its expected payoffs. Findings for asymmetric wars of attrition: Parties lower force in response to damage from their own actions, but disregard damage from the adversary. Consequently, if the adversary-inflicted damage is greater, the party's expected payoffs actually decrease.