스테이블코인 법제화의 주요 쟁점과 우리나라의 입법 방향 - 미국 GENIUS 법 제정의 시사점을 반영하여 -

Stablecoins are a form of digital currency with the potential to significantly enhance the speed and efficiency of payment and settlement systems by minimizing the involvement of traditional intermediaries and enabling frictionless cross-border transactions. Particularly when linked to a specific fiat currency, stablecoins can function not merely as a means of payment, but—when used globally in conjunction with reserve currencies such as the U.S. dollar—may exert substantial influence on national monetary policies and the U.S. dollar–based global monetary system. Thus, a prudent and carefully calibrated regulatory approach is required. However, the expectation that U.S. dollar-based stablecoins will become dominant should not result in a passive or overly cautious stance. Korea must proactively explore the feasibility of a Korean won-based stablecoin, while also leaving open the possibility that domestic banks and corporations may issue or utilize dollar-based stablecoins. In the absence of a regulatory framework, rapid growth in stablecoin adoption could pose latent systemic risks to financial stability. Therefore, an appropriate regulatory regime must be established swiftly, premised on the assumption that stablecoins will be introduced into the financial system. Although the Korean won should, in principle, serve as the reference asset for domestic stablecoins, the practical scope of their use is inevitably limited given the current position of the won in the international financial market. Accordingly, it is necessary to allow domestic institutions to issue and circulate stablecoins that reference foreign fiat currencies. At the same time, digital assets with high price volatility—such as Bitcoin—should not be permitted as reference assets or reserve holdings. Stablecoin issuance should be limited to those backed by fiat currencies, excluding unstable foreign currencies from eligibility in order to ensure value stability. It is desirable to restrict stablecoin issuers to banks or equivalent regulated institutions. Issuance could initially be limited strictly to banks, with gradual expansion considered once potential risks are more clearly understood. If necessary, a review and approval mechanism should be established—comprising the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Financial Services Commission, and the Bank of Korea—to determine issuer eligibility. To secure trust and stability, stablecoin issuers should be required to hold sufficient reserve assets, and holders should be guaranteed priority rights of redemption in the event of issuer insolvency or distress. The reserve ratio and reserve asset composition may be determined flexibly based on the characteristics of each issuer. Regarding supervisory structure, while the United States involves multiple regulatory agencies, consistent oversight is maintained within the banking supervisory framework. Likewise, in Korea, it would be appropriate to establish a dual supervisory model in which the Financial Services Commission serves as the primary regulator while the Bank of Korea participates actively to reflect the intrinsic nature of stablecoins as instruments of payment and settlement.