공공기관 감사성과의 영향요인 분석 :상임감사와 감사위원회의 조절효과를 중심으로

This study aims to empirically examine whether audit performance differs by audit governance structure in public institutions and whether the effects of audit qualifications and internal control functions on audit performance are moderated by the standing auditor and audit committee arrangements. To this end, the study uses data from 300 public institutions that were subject to the performance evaluation of standing auditors and audit committee members under the 2018–2022 Public Institution Management Evaluation. Audit performance is measured by the “appropriateness of internal audit operational performance and follow-up management” (the Board of Audit and Inspection’s assessment of self-audit activities, out of 25 points), and audit structure is operationalized as whether an audit committee is established. Audit expertise, ethics and independence, and the degree of strengthening internal control functions are set as key explanatory variables. A fixed-effects model controlling for organizational size and year effects is employed. The results show that, in models without interaction terms, expertise is the only factor that has a statistically significant effect on audit performance; ethics and independence display a negative direction, and internal control functions a positive direction, but their statistical significance is limited. The presence of an audit committee itself is not significantly associated with audit performance. In the moderation analysis, however, the interaction term “expertise × standing auditor” has a significant positive effect, suggesting that appointing and developing standing auditors with strong professional competence may contribute to improving internal audit performance. In contrast, audit committee-related interaction terms and other moderating effects are largely insignificant. These findings imply that strengthening professional requirements for standing auditors, refining appointment criteria, and establishing education and competency management systems may be more critical policy levers than a simple expansion of audit governance forms. The effectiveness of audit committees should also be re-examined through tailored designs that reflect institutional characteristics and operational realities, along with performance-based monitoring.