Does the Mandatory Bid Rule Discourage Acquisitions above the Threshold?
Does the Mandatory Bid Rule Discourage Acquisitions above the Threshold?
김우찬(고려대학교); 이용준(University of Michigan); 김부식(고려대학교)
39권 1호, 125~170쪽
초록
Our study challenges the belief that the mandatory bid rule (MBR) raises acquisition costs and deters takeovers. Leveraging the staggered adoptions of the mandatory bid rule (MBR) globally, we find that the MBR reduces the control premium, a key component of acquisition costs. Moreover, evidence does not support the claim that MBR discourages acquisitions above the threshold. While post-MBR ownership levels from block trades decline slightly, the likelihood of crossing the threshold remains unchanged. In the U.K., private deals above the threshold are fewer than below, but this gap is even larger in the U.S., which does not have an MBR.
Abstract
Our study challenges the belief that the mandatory bid rule (MBR) raises acquisition costs and deters takeovers. Leveraging the staggered adoptions of the mandatory bid rule (MBR) globally, we find that the MBR reduces the control premium, a key component of acquisition costs. Moreover, evidence does not support the claim that MBR discourages acquisitions above the threshold. While post-MBR ownership levels from block trades decline slightly, the likelihood of crossing the threshold remains unchanged. In the U.K., private deals above the threshold are fewer than below, but this gap is even larger in the U.S., which does not have an MBR.
- 발행기관:
- 한국재무학회
- 분류:
- 경영학