에피쿠로스학파의 정의론과 현대적 함의

One of the most distinctive features of our society is its strong emphasis on justice. This is hardly surprising, given that ancient Roman law placed great weight on justice and that our legal scholarship belongs to the continental legal tradition that inherited this orientation. Yet in the modern era, where virtually everyone seeks to justify their claims in the name of justice—and often elevates it as an absolute value—it has become common in courts and political arenas to witness situations in which “justice confronts justice.” Despite this excessive preoccupation, we have tended to overlook a fundamental question: does justice truly possess universal and objective reality? Those who invoke justice often take such an assumption for granted, but without presupposing a particular metaphysical framework, they cannot clearly articulate its foundation. This raises concerns about whether it is wise to transform matters that could be resolved through mutual listening and adequate coordination into mutually exclusive questions of truth, thereby provoking antagonistic competition. It is for this reason that the present study turns to the Epicurean theory of justice. This paper surveys Epicurean philosophy and its account of justice, and examines several issues: whether a conventionalist understanding of justice undermines the moral binding force of law; whether grounding justice in social need and utility renders it vague or vulnerable to value relativism; and, in light of contemporary classifications of legal theory, whether Epicurean thought should be understood as a form of natural law theory or as belonging to the tradition of legal positivism. According to the Epicureans, justice has no universal or objective existence; rather, laws arise through convention for the sake of social need and benefit. Through the mediating role of law’s usefulness, obedience to law guarantees legal justice, while justice as a personal virtue guides individuals to comply with the law. Thus, the conventional character of justice does not weaken the binding force of law. Although legal justice may exhibit value‑relative aspects, this cannot be regarded as a decisive flaw in the Epicurean account. In terms of legal‑theoretical classification, Epicureanism resembles legal positivism in its emphasis on convention, yet it also shares affinities with the natural‑law tradition insofar as it links law and justice through social utility. In conclusion, this study explores the implications of Epicurean justice theory for an age of pluralism, in which disagreement is inevitable, and questions whether justice theories that generate an excess of “justice” truly offer an appropriate solution.