금융기관 보상 규제는 보수주의를 강화하는가?: 클로백과 이연지급보수 제도의 상이한 효과

This study empirically examines the effects of clawback and deferred compensation provisions in executive compensation contracts on conditional accounting conservatism in financial institutions. Although these compensation mechanisms are intended to mitigate short-termism and excessive risk-taking and to promote more conservative financial reporting, empirical evidence that explicitly considers the accounting information environment of financial institutions remains limited. Using a sample of financial holding companies, banks, insurance companies, securities firms, and credit card companies listed on the Korean stock market from 2019 to 2024, this study applies the models of Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2008) to measure conditional conservatism. The results indicate that financial institutions adopting clawback provisions exhibit more timely recognition of economic losses, whereas those operating deferred compensation schemes display a weakening of conditional conservatism. These findings suggest that clawback and deferred compensation do not function as homogeneous governance mechanisms and influence financial reporting through fundamentally different channels. Overall, this study revisits the prevailing optimism surrounding compensation regulation in financial institutions and provides implications for the institutional design of clawback and deferred compensation policies.