미국의 내부 신고제도(whistleblower system)의 구조와 시사점- 증권법 위반 및 회계 부정 내부 신고 포상금 제도를 중심으로 -

This study investigates the whistleblower reward system of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and proposes practical measures to improve South Koreaʼs regulatory framework, aiming to enhance accounting transparency and the preemptive detection of unfair trading and financial fraud. South Koreaʼs 60th-place ranking out of 69 countries in the 2025 IMD Accounting Transparency index underscores the imperative for a robust incentive structure to restore global trust and national competitiveness. Given that high-level financial crimes are often accessible only to a select group of insiders, designing ʻpowerful incentivesʼ is essential to motivate these individuals. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the U.S. SEC whistleblower program, which overcame the limitations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)—specifically its lack of financial rewards—through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The SEC program operates under strict criteria of ʻvoluntarily submission of informationʼ and ʻoriginal information,ʼ providing rewards of 10% to 30% of collected monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Crucially, the ʻInvestor Protection Fund (IPF),ʼ which is funded by sanctions rather than taxpayer money, has established a virtuous cycle that incentivizes whistleblowing without fiscal constraints. In contrast, the Korean system remains hindered by its reliance on general fiscal budgets and a fragmented legal reporting structure, resulting in low incentives and procedural inefficiencies. Based on this comparative analysis, this research proposes four key structural reforms for the Korean system: First, the establishment of a self-sustaining funding structure. Following the SECʼs IPF model, an independent fund should be created utilizing fines and penalties to provide powerful economic incentives beyond the limits of annual budgets. Second, the implementation of sophisticated control mechanisms against system abuse. To preserve administrative resources, institutional safeguards such as ʻpermanent exclusion rulesʼ or ʻautomatic rejection systemsʼ for frivolous or unsubstantiated claims should be adopted. Third, the integration of reporting channels and reward calculation standards. The current fragmented framework under the Capital Markets Act and the External Audit Act should be unified to ensure administrative consistency and predictability. Fourth, the comprehensive introduction of ʻnon-real-name proxy reporting.ʼ To mitigate the risk of identity exposure, allowing whistleblowers to report through legal counsel will lower psychological barriers and provide substantive confidentiality. In conclusion, this study argues that a holistic institutional design—combining funding independence, procedural consistency, and practical protection—is more vital than a mere increase in reward size for transforming the capital market surveillance paradigm. Such structural reforms will serve as a cornerstone for reducing the social costs of accounting fraud and strengthening the global competitiveness of the Korean capital market.