성공적인 에너지전환을 위한 온실가스 배출권거래제의 개선방안

South Korea’s ETS is difficult to evaluate as successful, given its poor track record in reducing GHG emissions and very low average prices of emission allowances. This is because a vast majority of emission allowances are freely allocated, combined with relatively low reduction targets. It has failed to provide economic incentives for GHG reduction. The current price control system focused primarily on preventing price spikes has also failed to serve as a mechanism to support price levels. To enhance the effectiveness of the ETS, it should be redesigned as follows: (1) Strengthening NDC: The 2035 NDC, currently set at 53%~61% compared to 2018 levels, must aim for at least a 61% reduction rather than 53%. Additionally, the reduction target for the industrial sector, which remain very low despite its high share of national emissions, must be adjusted upward. Considering South Korea’s international standing and the need for a long-term perspective, the government should establish a more ambitious NDC and a detailed roadmap for achieving carbon neutrality. Strong government will is essential in making the nation progress a step forward. (2) Speedy Transition to Auctioning: The main allocation method should become auctioning, starting with 100% auctioning for the power generation sector. This sector has the greatest potential for GHG reduction and can function as a catalyst for energy transition in the whole nation. Unless the proportion of renewable energy increases in the electric power sector, electrification for decarbonization is impossible; thus, the transition to 100% auctioning in the sector is necessary. Shifting to an auction-based system will generate significant revenues, which can be utilized for climate crisis response budgets, including renewable energy support policies, thereby solving the problem of insufficient financial resources. (3) Redesigning Price Control Mechanism: Drawing on the example of California ETS, which operates its price control mechanism in conjunction with auction prices in order to support prices, South Korea needs to redesign its mechanism. The current model is overly biased toward preventing price surges. In the alternative, South Korea could adopt a mechanism similar to that of the EU ETS, where emission allowances in the MSR are supplied or removed according to auction volumes. However, for a price control mechanism to function effectively, liquidity must be strengthened, which requires a significant increase in the proportion of auctioning.