도시계획 변경 사전협상제도의 법적 성격과 한계 – 법률우위·법률유보·비례의 원칙에 대한 재검토

This study conceptualizes Korea’s pre-negotiation scheme for urban plan changes as a special procedure within the district unit planning system and reassesses its conformity with the principles of legality, statutory reservation, and proportionality. The analysis shows that (i) reliance on the open-ended clause “as prescribed by the district unit plan” for contribution rates, calculation methods, and procedures undermines predictability and allows room for discretionary application by local governments; (ii) the combined use of area- and value-based metrics, inconsistencies in the timing of ex-ante and ex-post appraisals, and the imposition of fixed-rate contributions upon facility de-designation result in excessive burdens; and (iii) the continued non-recognition of actual costs—such as design, supervision, financing, and value-added tax—risks infringing the principle of proportionality. To address these issues, this paper proposes: (1) codifying contribution caps, valuation principles, and grounds for mitigation in statutes or presidential decrees, thereby limiting negotiations to a supplementary role; (2) adopting a unified valuation model that deducts normal price appreciation from land value increments; and (3) ensuring full recognition of actual costs for land and facility provision. These reforms are intended to provide normative standards and operational improvements, grounded in case studies, legislation, and judicial precedents, to balance the fair distribution of planning gains with development feasibility.