DSR․LTV․DTI 주택금융규제의 헌법적 한계와 주거권 보장에 관한 연구

This study focuses on the normative point at which the macroprudential policy objective of household debt management comes into conflict with citizens’ substantive right to housing, and seeks to examine the constitutional legitimacy of the current housing finance regulatory regime as well as appropriate regulatory alternatives. In particular, it conducts a critical analysis on the basis that key regulatory instruments such as LTV and DSR, although formally taking the form of soft law through administrative guidelines and supervisory regulations, have a “quasi-normative effect” that substantially restricts fundamental rights. Korea is characterized by a structurally high share of real estate in household assets and a household debt-to-GDP ratio that is also high compared to major advanced economies. Against this backdrop, housing finance regulation centered on LTV, DTI, and DSR has functioned as a core policy tool. In particular, the recently introduced and strengthened stress DSR system has contributed to enhancing the stability of the financial system, but it has also been criticized for structurally constraining access to the housing market for young people, newlyweds, and actual homebuyers without existing homeownership. Based on this problem awareness, this study reconstructs housing finance regulation not merely as an economic or financial policy instrument, but as an exercise of public power that directly limits citizens’ property rights and right to housing, and examines its legal basis and administrative law characteristics from a constitutional perspective. In particular, it analyzes how the current regulatory scheme operates through supervisory regulations, notices, and administrative guidelines based on broad delegation under Article 34 of the Banking Act, and how, although formally classified as administrative rules or administrative guidance, it in fact possesses the character of a quasi-legislative order with external binding force. Furthermore, this study examines the relationship between this regulatory structure and the principles of statutory reservation, prohibition of blanket delegation, and proportionality, and argues that the uniform and mechanical application of regulations may infringe the essential content of the right to housing. In addition, by comparing housing finance regulation and housing-rights protection policies in major foreign jurisdictions, the study confirms that the social costs of stricter financial regulation can be mitigated when such measures are combined with housing welfare, public housing, and tenant protection policies. On this basis, the study proposes a normative and institutional reconfiguration of housing finance regulation through the legalization of regulatory measures, differentiated regulatory design reflecting borrower characteristics, and strengthened procedural control in the formation and enforcement of regulation, so that financial stability and housing rights protection may operate in a mutually reinforcing manner.